Referendum, Pressure Release Valve or Pressure Cooker?

I've written before that direct democracy could be a useful pressure release valve for political activists who would be better persuading other voters than engaging in violent protest. On the other hand some commentators have lamented the animosity evident in the recent Scottish independence referendum. So what provokes aggression?
It could be that some people just can't consider that others have different values. Some are traditionalists, others progressives. Some narrowly nationalistic, others not.
Or it could be that people feel that they are being lied to, deceived or manipulated by leaders, politicians and campaigners. Maybe sometimes by design, sometimes by accident or misinterpretation. (Scotland can't have the pound, some said. Of course they can, they have pounds in their bank accounts and pockets. How're you going to stop them? What was meant was that the Bank of England would refuse to be lender of last resort to Scottish banks.)
Then there's the matter of forecasting the future benefits of a decision, and all the assumptions that that entails. Is it rosy or grey? Who knows? There's nothing true about forecasts, they are usually inaccurate, unless by luck, and often wildly wrong.
Maybe we can introduce systems that help to reduce some of these provocations. Laws against lying in public life would be a start. Discussion of the limits of forecasting would be useful. Appreciation of differences in values and respect for others opinions may be a cultural thing that could be learnt. Maybe doing direct democracy, and losing, builds a bit of humility that makes things less fraught next time. And maybe having a system of direct democracy that allows future corrections and amendments to recent decisions takes the edge off disappointment. If Switzerland changes its constitution by referendum then the system is already in place to change it back again, if demanded.
But when I sit back and consider the referendum for Scottish Independence and the state of Eastern Ukraine it's pretty obvious what's best!

Budgeting in Switzerland

There has been some concern expressed amongst the financial press that promises made to Scotland will cause budgetary uncertainty and devalue Britain as an economic safe haven (click here). But Switzerland shows that that need not be the case. The OECD published this detailed analysis in 2005. Things may have changed since but reading it reveals a number of things. They have a constitutional commitment to debt containment. The limits are defined mathematically and compensate for the business cycle. 75% of the budget is transferred to sub-national government and social security funds. It's complicated, but shows how detailed financial policy can be implemented in a direct democracy federation by elected, often part time, politicians.
The report also provides a succinct summary of Switzerland's constitutional history:-

"Switzerland came into existence as a national State in the first half of the 19th century as a consequence of a process of political integration of 25 regional communities known as “cantons”. This process culminated in the establishment of the first federal constitution in 1848. This constitution was based on a compromise between a liberal Protestant majority, mostly living in a small number of populous cantons, and a Catholic conservative minority, mostly living in a large number of thinly populated cantons. The rights of the minority were protected through constitutional provisions that guarantee the competences of the cantons and limit the responsibilities of the Federation and through cantonal representation in the federal political system, particularly in the Council of States (the upper chamber of Parliament)."

And it summarises their unique system:-

"The Swiss budgeting system is characterised by three special features that differentiate it from most other OECD countries:
● the political environment, characterised by direct democracy (referendums), federalism and a tradition/system of achieving consensus;
● the debt containment rule, which is a constitutional provision mandating a balanced budget over a business cycle (structural balance);● the nature of the Swiss federal budget as a transfer budget."

New Deal

Gordon Brown has announced a new deal for Scotland to encourage the 'No' vote, despite postal votes having already been cast, probably to the annoyance of some. If we used online voting this would not be a problem. Even those that had already cast their vote could get back online and change it, right up to the deadline. So Interactive Democracy supports the sort of changeable policies that we are seeing in Scotland far better than the existing postal voting system.

The Key Question

Referenda in Crimea and Scotland have one key yes/no question, but is that question the right one? Shouldn't the Crimeans have been asked if they wanted to be independent, part of Ukraine or part of Russia? The same complexity exists over Scotland's independence referendum as Merryn Somerset Webb explains in her article here. She points out that Quebec did things differently in the 1980s, offering a second referendum once details had been negotiated.
The problem with most referenda is that they are expensive to administer and costly to replicate. Not so with Interactive Democracy (ID): doing it online has tiny marginal costs. With ID, referenda can be frequent and thus much more accurate and refined.
And I suggest that if you don't vote then your Member of Parliament should vote on your behalf, so that frequent plebiscites don't become onerous yet you are always represented.