Fragile by Design

Fragile by Design is written by two academics, Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber, who set out to discover why some banking systems are unstable. MoneyWeek reported that
"They looked at five national case studies: the UK and the US (both democracies, yet prone to crisis); Canada (virtually crisis-free); Mexico (a crisis-prone autocracy); and Brazil (a bit of both).
"What they found was fascinating. Starting from the elegantly simple premise that a crisis occurs when banks hold too little capital and/or too many risky assets, the problem, logically, must be inadequate regulation. So their thesis is that regulatory standards and credit provision are "captured" by political special interests. While democracies generally fare better than autocracies, often this is just a matter of degree. Unfortunately it seems that boom/bust cycles are woven into the very fabric of US democracy."
Would Interactive Democracy change this?
Who knows, but it would change the game: power wouldn't be concentrated in a few hands; whistle blowers would be empowered; education about the banking system would be encouraged and transparency enhanced.
Why?
Because regulators would be more accountable to the electorate (who could call for their dismissal); anyone could create an initiative proposing changes; and the ensuing public debate, supported by probing journalism, professional bankers and academics, would shine a light on the system. This last point, that Interactive Democracy educates through debate, is my favourite advantage of direct democracy. It may also be more adaptable and less prone to opaque influence.
MoneyWeek's verdict on the book: "This is a great history of political interference in banking regulation - but a definitive analysis of the recent crisis it is not."

Inspired by MoneyWeek, 14 March 2014.

EU Regulation on Citizens' Initiative

This regulation specifies the security structure of a web site for Citizens' Initiatives.

I think that such a system should allow citizens to change their vote in subsequent sessions yet this regulation demands that data should not be alterable. However, such a limitation can be worked around by having the facility for later dated votes to supersede earlier ones.

The ability to change your vote allows voters to cast a vote at a time which is convenient to them and then change it later if they change their mind. It will reduce the information load on the system as a ballot reaches its deadline, will likely increase voting numbers as it makes the system more convenient and facilitates an increasing amount of debate, closer to the deadline, to have the chance to change the outcome.